Balanced permutations Even-Mansour ciphers by Gilboa, Shoni et al.
Balanced permutations Even-Mansour ciphers
Shoni Gilboa1, Shay Gueron2,3, and Mridul Nandi4
1 The Open University of Israel, Raanana 43107, Israel
2 University of Haifa, Israel
3 Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Israel
4 Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata
June 29, 2018
Abstract. The r-rounds Even-Mansour block cipher is a generalization
of the well known Even-Mansour block cipher to r iterations. Attacks
on this construction were described by Nikolic´ et al. and Dinur et al.,
for r = 2, 3. These attacks are only marginally better than brute force,
but are based on an interesting observation (due to Nikolic´ et al.): for
a “typical” permutation P , the distribution of P (x)⊕ x is not uniform.
This naturally raises the following question. Call permutations for which
the distribution of P (x)⊕x is uniform “balanced”. Is there a sufficiently
large family of balanced permutations, and what is the security of the
resulting Even-Mansour block cipher?
We show how to generate families of balanced permutations from the
Luby-Rackoff construction, and use them to define a 2n-bit block cipher
from the 2-rounds Even-Mansour scheme. We prove that this cipher is
indistinguishable from a random permutation of {0, 1}2n, for any adver-
sary who has oracle access to the public permutations and to an encryp-
tion/decryption oracle, as long as the number of queries is o(2n/2). As
a practical example, we discuss the properties and the performance of a
256-bit block cipher that is based on our construction, and uses AES as
the public permutation.
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1 Introduction
The r-rounds Even-Mansour (EM) block cipher, suggested by Bogdanov et al.
[2], encrypts an n-bit plaintext m by
EMP1,P2,...,PrK0,K1,...,Kr (m) = Pr(. . . P2(P1(m⊕K0)⊕K1) . . .⊕Kr−1)⊕Kr, (1)
where K0,K1, . . . ,Kr ∈ {0, 1}n are secret keys and P1, P2, . . . , Pr are publicly
known permutations, which are selected uniformly and independently at random,
from the set of permutations of {0, 1}n. The confidentiality of the EM cipher is
achieved even though the permutations P1, . . . , Pr are made public. For r = 1,
(1) reduces to the classical Even-Mansour construction [8].
ar
X
iv
:1
40
9.
04
21
v3
  [
cs
.C
R]
  2
0 A
ug
 20
15
As a practical example, Bogdanov et al. defined the 128-bit block cipher
AES2, which is an instantiation of the 2-rounds EM cipher where the two public
permutations are AES with two publicly known “arbitrary” keys (they chose
the binary digits of the constant pi). The complexity of the best (meet-in-the-
middle) attack they showed uses 2129.6 cipher revaluations. Consequently, they
conjectured that AES2 offers 128-bit security.
Understanding the security of the EM cipher has been the topic of extended
research. First, Even and Mansour [8] proved, for r = 1, that an adversary needs
to make Ω(2n/2) oracle queries before he can decrypt a new message with high
success probability. Daemen [5] showed that this bound is tight, by demonstrat-
ing a chosen-plaintext key-recovery attack after O(2n/2) evaluations of P1 and
the encryption oracle. Bogdanov et al. [2], showed, for the r-rounds EM cipher,
r ≥ 2, that an adversary who sees only O(22n/3) chosen plaintext-ciphertext
pairs cannot distinguish the encryption oracle from a random permutation of
{0, 1}n. This result has been recently improved by Chen and Steinberger [3], su-
perseding intermediate progress made by Steinberger [19] and by Lampe, Patarin
and Seurin [12]. They showed that for every r, an adversary needs Ω(2
r
r+1n) cho-
sen plaintext-ciphertext pairs before he can distinguish the r-rounds EM cipher
from a random permutation of {0, 1}n. This bound is tight, by Bogdanov et al.’s
[2] distinguishing attack after O(2
r
r+1n) queries.
Nikolic´ et al. [15] demonstrated a chosen-plaintext key-recovery attack on the
single key variant (K0 = K1 = K2) of the 2-rounds EM cipher. Subsequently,
Dinur et al. [7] produced additional key-recovery attacks on various other EM
variants. All the attack in [15] and [7] are only slightly better than a brute force
approach. For example, the attack ([7]) on the single key variant of the 2-rounds
EM cipher has time complexity O
(
logn
n 2
n
)
, and the attack ([7]) on AES2 (with
three different keys) has complexity of 2126.8 (still better than Bogdanov et al.
[2], thus enough to invalidate their that AES2 has 2128 security).
The above attacks are based on the astute observation, made in [15], that for
a ”typical” permutation P of {0, 1}n, the distribution of P (x)⊕x over uniformly
chosen x ∈ {0, 1}n is not uniform. Currently, this observation yields only weak
attacks, but the unveiled asymmetry may have the potential to lead to stronger
results.
This motivates the following question. Call a permutation P of {0, 1}n “bal-
anced” if the distribution of P (x) ⊕ x, over uniformly chosen x ∈ {0, 1}n, is
uniform. Can we construct a block cipher based on balanced permutations? We
point out that, a priori, it is not even clear that there exists a family of such
permutations, that is large enough to support a block cipher construction.
In this work, we show how to generate a large family of balanced permutations
of {0, 1}2n, by observing that a 2-rounds Luby-Rackoff construction with any
two identical permutations of {0, 1}n, always yields a balanced permutation (of
{0, 1}2n). We use these permutations in an EM setup (illustrated in Figure 2,
top panel), to construct a block cipher with block size of 2n bits. Note that
in this EM setup, the permutations P1, P2 are not chosen uniformly at random
from the set of all permutations of {0, 1}2n. They are selected from a particular
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subset of the permutations of {0, 1}2n, and defined via a random choice of two
permutations of {0, 1}n, as the paper describes.
For the security of the resulting 2n bits block cipher, we would ideally like
to maintain the security of the EM cipher (on blocks of 2n bits ). This would be
guaranteed if we replaced the random permutation in the EM cipher, with an
indifferentiable block cipher (as defined in [13]). However, the balanced permu-
tations we use in the EM construction are 2-rounds Luby-Rackoff permutations,
and it was shown in [4] that even the 5-rounds Luby-Rackoff construction does
not satisfy indifferentiability. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect weaker secu-
rity properties in our cipher. Indeed, we demonstrate a distinguishing (not a
key recovery) attack that uses O(2n/2) queries. On the other hand, we prove
that a smaller number of chosen plaintext-ciphertext queries is not enough to
distinguish the block cipher from a random permutation of {0, 1}2n.
We comment that the combination of EM and Luby-Rackoff constructions
have already been used and analyzed. Gentry and Ramzan [9] showed that the
internal permutation of the Even-Mansour construction for 2n-bits block size,
can be securely replaced by a 4-rounds Luby-Rackoff scheme with public round
functions. They proved that the resulting construction is secure up to O(2n/2)
queries. Lampe and Seurin [11] discuss r-rounds Luby-Rackoff constructions
where the round functions are of the form x 7→ Fi(Ki⊕x), Fi is a public random
function, and Ki is a (secret) round key. For an even number of rounds, this can
be seen as a r/2-rounds EM construction, where the permutations are 2-rounds
Luby-Rackoff permutations. They show that this construction is secure up to
O(2
tn
t+1 ) queries, where t = br/3c for non-adaptive chosen-plaintext adversaries,
and t = br/6c for adaptive chosen-plaintext and ciphertext adversaries. These
works bare some similarities to ours, but the new feature in our construction is
the emergence of balanced permutations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss balanced per-
mutations and balanced permutations EM ciphers. Section 3 provides general
background for the security analysis given in Section 4. In Section 5, we demon-
strate the distinguishing attack. A practical use of our construction is a 256-bit
block cipher is based on AES. Section 6 defines this cipher and discusses its
performance characteristics. We conclude with a discussion in Section 7.
2 Balanced permutations and balanced permutations EM
ciphers
2.1 Balanced permutations
Definition 1 (Balanced permutation5). Let σ be a permutation of {0, 1}n.
Define the function σ˜ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n by σ˜(ω) = ω ⊕ σ(ω), for every ω ∈
{0, 1}n. We say that σ is a balanced permutation if σ˜ is also a permutation.
5 Also known as “orthomorphism” in the mathematical literature
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Example 1. Let A ∈Mn×n(Z2) be a matrix such that both A and I +A are in-
vertible. Define piA : Zn2 → Zn2 by piA(x) = Ax. Then piA is a balance permutation
of {0, 1}n. One such matrix is defined by Ai,i = Ai,i+1 = 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n−1,
An,1 = 1 and Ai,j = 0 for all other 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n.
Example 2. Let a be an element of GF (2n) such that a 6= 0, 1. Identify GF (2n)
with {0, 1}n, so that field addition corresponds to bitwise XOR. The field’s mul-
tiplication is denoted by ×. The function x → a× x is a balanced permutation
of {0, 1}n. Note that this example is actually a special case of the previous one.
The balanced permutations provided by the above examples are a small family
of permutations, and moreover are all linear. We now give a recipe for generating
a large family of balanced permutations, by employing the Feistel construction
that turns any function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n to a permutation of {0, 1}2n.
Let us use the following notation. For a string ω ∈ {0, 1}2n, denote the
string of its first n bits by ωL ∈ {0, 1}n, and the string of its last n bits by
ωR ∈ {0, 1}n. Denote the concatenation of two strings ω1, ω2 ∈ {0, 1}n (in this
order) by ω1 ∗ ω2 ∈ {0, 1}2n. We have the following identities:
(ω1 ∗ ω2)L = ω1, (ω1 ∗ ω2)R = ω2, ωL ∗ ωR = ω.
Definition 2 (Luby-Rackoff permutations). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be
a function. Let LR[f ] : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}2n be the Luby-Rackoff (a.k.a Feistel)
permutation
LR[f ](ω) := ωR ∗ (ωL ⊕ f(ωR)) . (2)
For every r ≥ 2 and r functions f1, . . . , fr : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, we define the
r-rounds Luby-Rackoff permutation to be the composition
LR[f1, . . . , fr] := LR[fr] ◦ · · · ◦ LR[f1].
Since we use here extensively the special case LR[f, f ], we denote it by LR 2[f ].
The following proposition shows that when f is, itself, a permutation, then
LR 2[f ] is a balanced permutation.
Proposition 1. Let f be a permutation of {0, 1}n. Then, the 2-rounds Luby-
Rackoff permutation, LR 2[f ], is a balanced permutation of {0, 1}2n.
Proof. Denote P := LR 2[f ]. Observe first that
P (ω) = LR 2[f ](ω) = LR[f ] (LR[f ](ω)) = LR[f ] (ωR ∗ (ωL ⊕ f(ωR))) =
= (ωL ⊕ f(ωR)) ∗ (ωR ⊕ f (ωL ⊕ f(ωR))) . (3)
Therefore,
P˜ (ω) = f(ωR) ∗ f (ωL ⊕ f(ωR)) .
Assume that x, y ∈ {0, 1}2n such that P˜ (x) = P˜ (y), i.e.,
f(xR) ∗ f (xL ⊕ f(xR)) = f(yR) ∗ f (yL ⊕ f(yR))
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Then, f(xR) = f(yR) and f (xL ⊕ f(xR)) = f (yL ⊕ f(yR)). Since (by assump-
tion) f is one-to-one, xR = yR and xL ⊕ f(xR) = yL ⊕ f(yR), it follows that
xL = (xL ⊕ f(xR))⊕ f(xR) = (yL ⊕ f(yR))⊕ f(yR) = yL. We established that
P˜ (x) = P˜ (y) implies x = xL ∗ xR = yL ∗ yR = y which concludes the proof.
Figure 1 shows an illustration of 2-rounds Luby-Rackoff (balanced) permutation.
Fig. 1. The figure shows a function from {0, 1}2n to {0, 1}2n, based on two Feistel
rounds with a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. For any function f , this construction
is a permutation of {0, 1}2n, denoted LR 2[f ]. We call it a “2-rounds Luby-Rackoff
permutation”. Proposition 1 shows that if f itself is a permutation of {0, 1}n, then
LR 2[f ] is a balanced permutation of {0, 1}2n.
2.2 Balanced permutations EM ciphers
Definition 3 (r-rounds balanced permutations EM ciphers (BPEM)).
Let n ≥ 1 and r ≥ 1 be integers. Let K0,K1, . . . ,Kr be r+ 1 strings in {0, 1}2n.
Let f1,f2,. . ., fr be r permutations of {0, 1}n. Their associated 2-rounds Luby-
Rackoff (balanced) permutations (of {0, 1}2n) are LR 2[f1], LR 2[f2], . . . , LR 2[fr],
respectively. The r-rounds balanced permutations EM (BPEM) block cipher is
defined as
BPEM[K0,K1, . . . ,Kr; f1, . . . , fr] := EM
LR 2[f1],LR
2[f2],...,LR
2[fr]
K0,K1,...,Kr
, (4)
(where EM is defined by (1)). It encrypts 2n-bit blocks with an r-rounds EM
cipher with the keys K0,K1, . . . ,Kr, where the r permutations P1, P2, . . . , Pr (of
{0, 1}2n) are set to be LR 2[f1], LR 2[f2], . . . , LR 2[fr], respectively.
The use of the r-rounds BPEM cipher for encryption (and decryption) starts
with an initialization step, where the permutations f1, f2, . . . , fr are selected uni-
formly and independently, at random from the set of permutations of {0, 1}n. Af-
ter they are selected, they can be made public. Subsequently, per session/message,
the secret keys K0,K1, . . . ,Kr are selected uniformly and independently, at ran-
dom, from {0, 1}2n. Figure 2 illustrates a 2-rounds BPEM cipher BPEM[K0,K1,K2; f1, f2],
which is the focus of this paper.
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Remark 1. The r-rounds EM cipher is not necessarily secure with any choice of
balanced permutations as P1, P2, . . . , Pr. For example, it can be easily broken
when using the linear balanced permutations shown in Examples 1 and 2.
Remark 2. In our construction, the permutations P1, P2, . . . , Pr are not random
permutations. Therefore, the security analysis of the “classical” EM does not
apply, and the resulting cipher (BPEM) may not be secure. Indeed, it is easy to
see that the 1-round BPEM does not provide confidentiality. For any plaintexts
m ∈ {0, 1}2n, we have, by (3),(
LR 2[f ](m⊕K0)
)
L
= (mL ⊕ (K0)L)⊕ f(mR ⊕ (K0)R)
Therefore, by (4), (1) and (3),
(BPEM[K0,K1; f ](m))L =
(
EM
LR 2[f ]
K0,K1
(m)
)
L
=
(
LR 2[f ](m⊕K0)
)
L
⊕ (K1)L =
= mL ⊕ (K0)L ⊕ (K1)L ⊕ f(mR ⊕ (K0)R).
It follows that if, e.g., (m1)R = (m2)R then
(BPEM[K0,K1; f ](m1)⊕ BPEM[K0,K1; f ](m2))L = (m1 ⊕m2)L
which means that the ciphertexts leak out information on m1,m2. This also
implies that the r-rounds BPEM cipher must be used with r ≥ 2 to have any
hope for achieving security.
Remark 3. By construction, BPEM[K0,K1, . . . ,Kr; f1, . . . , fr] (r ≥ 2) is immune
against any attack that tries to leverage the non-uniformity of P (x)⊕x (including
[15] and [7])). Obviously, this does not guarantee it is secure (as indicated in
Remark 1).
In Section 4 we prove that the 2-round BPEM cipher is indistinguishable
from a random permutation.
2.3 Equivalent representation of BPEM in terms of LR
In this section we show that 2-rounds BPEM can be viewed as a “keyed”6 Luby-
Rackoff cipher (in fact, the r-rounds BPEM has a similar representation for every
r).
Notation 1 Given a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n and a key K ∈ {0, 1}n we
denote EMfK,K by f
⊕K , namely
EMfK,K(x) = f(x⊕K)⊕K.
6 By “keyed” we mean that each function used in the Luby-Rackoff construction is
selected from a family of functions indexed by a key.
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Fig. 2. The 2-rounds balanced permutations EM (BPEM) cipher operates on blocks of
size 2n bits. The permutations P1 and P2 are balanced permutations of {0, 1}2n, defined
as 2-rounds Luby-Rackoff permutations. f1 and f2 are two (public) permutations of
{0, 1}n. Each of K0,K1,K2 is a 2n-bit secret key. See explanation in the text.
Lemma 1. Let K0,K1,K2 ∈ {0, 1}2n and let f1, f2 be two permutations of
{0, 1}n. Then,
BPEM[K0,K1,K2; f1, f2] = LR[f
⊕K′1
1 , f
⊕K′2
1 , f
⊕K′3
2 , f
⊕K′4
2 ]⊕ (K ′6 ∗K ′5)
where 
K ′1
K ′2
K ′3
K ′4
K ′5
K ′6
 =

1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 1
 ·

(K0)R
(K0)L
(K1)R
(K1)L
(K2)R
(K2)L
 . (5)
Proof. For every function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, K ∈ {0, 1}2n and ω ∈ {0, 1}2n
we have, by (2),
LR[f ](ω ⊕K) = (ω ⊕K)R ∗ ((ω ⊕K)L ⊕ f((ω ⊕K)R)) =
= (ωR ∗ (ωL ⊕ f(ωR ⊕KR)⊕KR))⊕ (KR ∗ (KL ⊕KR)) =
=
(
ωR ∗
(
ωL ⊕ f⊕KR(ωR)
))⊕ (KR ∗ (KL ⊕KR)) =
= LR
[
f⊕KR
]
(ω)⊕ (KR ∗ (KL ⊕KR))
and hence
LR 2[f ](ω ⊕K) = LR[f ] (LR[f ](ω ⊕K)) =
= LR[f ]
((
LR
[
f⊕KR
]
(ω)
)⊕ (KR ∗ (KL ⊕KR))) =
= LR
[
f⊕(KL⊕KR)
] (
LR
[
f⊕KR
]
(ω)
)⊕ ((KL ⊕KR) ∗KL) =
= LR
[
f⊕KR , f⊕(KL⊕KR)
]
(ω)⊕ ((KL ⊕KR) ∗KL) .
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In particular
LR 2[f1](ω ⊕K0) =
= LR
[
f
⊕(K0)R
1 , f
⊕((K0)L⊕(K0)R)
1
]
(ω)⊕ (((K0)L ⊕ (K0)R) ∗ (K0)L) =
= LR
[
f
⊕K′1
1 , f
⊕K′2
1
]
(ω)⊕ (K ′2 ∗ (K ′1 ⊕K ′2))
and then
LR 2[f2]
(
LR 2[f1](ω ⊕K0)⊕K1
)
=
=LR 2[f2]
(
LR
[
f
⊕K′1
1 , f
⊕K′2
1
]
(ω)⊕ (K ′2 ∗ (K ′1 ⊕K ′2))⊕K1
)
=
=LR
[
f
⊕(K′1⊕K′2⊕(K1)R)
2 , f
⊕(K′1⊕(K1)L⊕(K1)R)
2
](
LR
[
f
⊕K′1
1 , f
⊕K′2
1
]
(ω)
)
⊕
⊕ ((K ′1 ⊕ (K1)L ⊕ (K1)R) ∗ (K ′2 ⊕ (K1)L)) =
=LR
[
f
⊕K′1
1 , f
⊕K′2
1 , f
⊕K′3
2 , f
⊕K′4
2
]
(ω)⊕ (K ′4 ∗ (K ′3 ⊕K ′4)) .
Therefore, by (4) and (1),
BPEM [K0,K1,K2; f1, f2] (ω) = EM
LR 2[f1],LR
2[f2]
K0,K1,K2
(ω) =
=LR 2[f2]
(
LR 2[f1](ω ⊕K0)⊕K1
)⊕K2 =
=LR
[
f
⊕K′1
1 , f
⊕K′2
1 , f
⊕K′3
2 , f
⊕K′4
2
]
(ω)⊕ ((K ′4 ⊕ (K2)L) ∗ (K ′3 ⊕K ′4 ⊕ (K2)R)) =
=LR
[
f
⊕K′1
1 , f
⊕K′2
1 , f
⊕K′3
2 , f
⊕K′4
2
]
(ω)⊕ (K ′6 ∗K ′5).
3 Security preliminaries and definitions
Let A be an oracle adversary which interacts with one or more oracles. Suppose
that O and O′ are two oracles (or a tuple of oracles) with same domain and
range spaces. We define the distinguishing advantage of A distinguishing O and
O′ as
∆A(O;O′) :=
∣∣Pr[AO = 1]− Pr[AO′ = 1]∣∣.
The maximum advantage maxA∆A(O;O′) over all adversaries with complexity θ
(which includes query, time complexities etc.) is denoted by ∆θ(O;O′). When we
consider computationally unbounded adversaries (which is done in this paper),
the time and memory parameters are not present and so we only consider query
complexities. In the case of a single oracle, θ is the number of queries, and in the
case of a tuple of oracles, θ would be of the form (q1, . . . , qr) where qi denotes the
number of queries to the ith oracle. While we define security advantages of O,
we usually choose O′ to be an ideal candidate, such as the random permutation
Π or a random function. The PRP-advantage of A against a keyed construction
CK is ∆A(CK ;Π). The maximum PRP-advantage with query complexity θ is
denoted as ∆prpC (θ).
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In this paper, we always assume that queries to an oracle O are allowed in
both directions, i.e., to O−1 as well. We denote
∆±A(O,O′) := ∆A
(
(O,O−1); (O′,O′−1)
)
,
∆±θ (O,O′) := ∆θ
(
(O,O−1); (O′,O′−1)
)
.
The SPRP-advantage of a keyed construction CK (where the adversary has access
to both the encryption CK and its decryption C−1K ) is defined by
∆sprpC (θ) := ∆
±
θ (CK ;Π).
When a construction C is based on one or more ideal permutations or random
permutations f1, . . . , fr and a key K, we define SPRP-advantage of a distin-
guisher A, in presence of ideal candidates, as ∆±A((C, f1, . . . , fr); (Π, f1, . . . , fr))
where Π is sampled independently of fˆ := (f1, . . . , fr). We denote the maximum
advantage by ∆im-sprpC (θ) := ∆
±
θ ((C, fˆ); (Π, fˆ)) which we call SPRP-advantage
in the ideal model. The complexity parameters of the above advantages depend
on the number of oracles, and will be explicitly declared in specific instances.
We state two simple observations on the distinguishing advantages for oracles
(we skip the proofs of these observations, as these are straightforward).
Observation 1 If O1, O2 and O′ are three independent oracles, then
∆±q,q′ ((O1,O′); (O2,O′)) ≤ ∆±q (O1;O2).
Observation 2 If C is an oracle construction, then (by using standard reduc-
tion)
∆±q,q′
(
(CO1 ,O′); (CO2 ,O′)) ≤ ∆±rq,q′ ((O1,O′); (O2,O′))
(where r is the number of queries to O, needed to simulate one query to the
construction CO).
Note that in the Observation 2, we do not need to assume any kind of in-
dependence of the oracles. Analogous observations, up to obvious changes, hold
for the case where O1,O2,O′ are tuples of oracles.
3.1 Coefficient-H technique
Patarin’s coefficient-H technique [16] (see also [17]) is a tool for showing an upper
bound for the distinguishing advantage. Here is the basic result of the technique.
Theorem 1 (Patarin [16]). Let O and O′ be two oracle algorithms with do-
main D and range R. Suppose there exist a set Vbad ⊆ Dq ×Rq and ε > 0 such
that the following conditions hold:
1. For all (x1, . . . , xq, y1, . . ., yq) 6∈ Vbad,
Pr[O(x1) = y1, . . . ,O(xq) = yq] ≥ (1− ε) Pr[O′(x1) = y1, . . . ,O′(xq) = yq]
(the above probabilities are called interpolation probabilities).
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2. For all A making at most q queries to O′, Pr[Trans(AO′) ∈ Vbad] ≤ δ where
Trans(AO
′
) = (x1, . . . , xq, y1, . . . , yq), xi and yi denote the i
th query and
response of A to O′.
Then,
∆q(O;O′) ≤ ε+ δ.
The above result can be applied for more than one oracle. In such cases we
split the parameter q into (q1, . . . , qr) where qi denotes the maximum number of
queries to the ith oracle. Moreover, if we have an oracle O and its inverse O−1
then the interpolation probability for both O and O−1 can be simply expressed
through the interpolation probability of O only. For example, if an adversary
makes a query y to O−1 and obtains the response x, we can write O(x) = y.
Therefore, under the conditions of Theorem 1 we also have ∆±q (O;O′) ≤ ε+ δ.
3.2 Known related results
The security of Even-Mansour cipher It is known that the Even-Mansour
cipher EMK0,K1 is SPRP secure in the ideal model, in the following sense:
∆im-sprpEM (q1, q2) = O(q1q2/2
n). The same is true for the single key variant EMK,K .
In Section 4, we provide (using Patarin’s coefficient-H technique) a simple proof
of this result (Lemma 2) and a more general result (Lemma 3).
The security of Luby-Rackoff encryption The 3-rounds Luby-Rackoff con-
struction is PRP secure and the 4-rounds Luby-Rackoff construction is SPRP
secure , when the underlying functions fi are PRP’s (or PRF’s). We use the
following quantified version of the SPRP security of the 4-rounds case.
Theorem 2 (Piret [18]). Let Π1, . . . ,Π4 be four independent random per-
mutations of {0, 1}n, and let Π be a random permutation of {0, 1}2n. Then,
LR[Π1, . . . ,Π4] is SPRP secure in the following sense:
∆±q (LR[Π1, . . . ,Π4];Π) ≤
5q(q − 1)
2n
.
The above bound O(q2/2n) is tight (see [20]). In the proof of Theorem 7 we
use the following, more general, result.
Theorem 3 (Nandi [14]). Let r ≥ 4, and let (α1, . . . αr) be a sequence of
numbers from {1, . . . , t} such that (α1, . . . αr) 6= (αr, . . . , α1). Let Π1, . . . ,Πt be t
independent random permutations of {0, 1}n, and let Π be a random permutation
of {0, 1}2n. Then, LR[Πα1 , . . . ,Παr ] is SPRP secure in the following sense:
∆q(LR[Πα1 , . . . ,Παr ];Π) ≤
(r2 + 1)q2
2n − 1 +
q2
22n
.
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4 Security analysis of our construction
4.1 Security analysis of tuples of single key 1-round EM cipher
Notation 2 Let x1, . . . , xt ∈ {0, 1}n. We use coll(x1, . . . , xt) to indicate the
existence of a collision, i.e., that xi = xj for some 1 ≤ i < j ≤ t. Otherwise, we
write distn(x1, . . . , xt), and say that the tuple (x1, . . . , xt) is block-wise distinct.
Given a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n and a tuple x1, . . . , xt ∈ {0, 1}n we define
f (t)(x1, . . . , xt) := (f(x1), . . . , f(xt)).
For positive integers m, r, denote
P (m, r) = m(m− 1) · · · (m− r + 1).
Observation 3 For every distn(x1, . . . , xt), distn(y1, . . . , yt) and a uniform ran-
dom permutation Π on {0, 1}n,
Pr[Π(t)(x1, . . . , xt) = (y1, . . . , yt)] =
1
P (2n, t)
More generally, let Π1, . . . ,Πr be independent uniform random permutations
over {0, 1}n then for every block-wise distinct tuples Xi, Y i ∈ ({0, 1}n)ti , 1 ≤
i ≤ r we have
Pr[Π
(t1)
1 (X
1) = Y 1, . . . ,Π(tr)r (X
r) = Y r] =
1
P (2n, t1)
× · · · × 1
P (2n, tr)
. (6)
Now we show that for a random permutation Π of {0, 1}n and a uniformly
chosen K, the permutation Π⊕K (single keyed 1-round EM, see Notation 1) is
SPRP secure in the ideal model.
Lemma 2. Let Π and Π1 be independent random permutations of {0, 1}n. Then
∆±q1,q2
(
(Π⊕K , Π); (Π1, Π)
) ≤ 2q1q2
2n
.
Proof. We use Patarin’s coefficient H-technique. We take the set of bad views
Vbad to be the empty set. We need to show that for every tuples M,C ∈
({0, 1}n)q1 , x, y ∈ ({0, 1}n)q2 ,
Pr[Π⊕K(Mi) = Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ q1, Π(xi) = yi, 1 ≤ j ≤ q2] ≥
≥ (1− ε) Pr[Π1(Mi) = Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ q1, Π(xi) = yi, 1 ≤ j ≤ q2],
where ε = 2q1q22n . With no loss of generality we may assume that each of the
tuples M,C, x, y is block-wise distinct. Then, by (6),
Iideal := Pr[Π1(Mi) = Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ q1, Π(xi) = yi, 1 ≤ j ≤ q2] =
= Pr[Π
(q1)
1 (M) = C,Π
(q2)(x) = y] =
1
P (2n, q1)
× 1
P (2n, q2)
.
11
We say that a key K ∈ {0, 1}n is “good” if K⊕Mi 6= xj and K⊕Ci 6= yj for all
1 ≤ i ≤ q1, 1 ≤ j ≤ q2. In other words, for a good key all the inputs (outputs) of
Π (in the Ireal computation) are block-wise distinct. Thus, for any given good
key K,
Pr[Π(Mi ⊕K) = (K ⊕ Ci), 1 ≤ i ≤ q1, Π(xj) = yj , 1 ≤ j ≤ q2] =
=
1
P (2n, q1 + q2)
≥ Iideal.
By a simple counting argument, the number of good keys is at least 2n − 2q1q2,
i.e., the probability that a randomly chosen key is good, is at least (1−ε), where
ε = 2q1q22n . Therefore, we have
Ireal := Pr[Π
⊕K(Mi) = Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ q1, Π(xi) = yi, 1 ≤ j ≤ q2] ≥ (1− ε)Iideal
and the result follows by Theorem 1.
Now, we extend Lemma 2 to a tuple (Π
⊕Kβ1
α1 , . . . ,Π
⊕Kβt
αt ) of single key 1-
round EM encryptions, where some keys and permutations can be repeated.
Lemma 3. Let Π1, . . . ,Πr, Π¯1, . . . , Π¯t be independent random permutations of
{0, 1}n and K1, . . .Ks be chosen uniformly and independently from {0, 1}n. We
write Πˆ to denote (Π1, . . . ,Πr). Let (α1, . . . , αt) and (β1, . . . , βt) be a sequence
of elements from {1, . . . , r} and {1, . . . , s}, respectively, such that (αi, βi)’s are
distinct. Then, for any θ = (q1, . . . , qt, q
′
1, . . . , q
′
r) (specifying the maximum num-
ber of queries for each permutation) we have
∆±θ
(
(Π¯1, . . . , Π¯t, Πˆ); (Π
⊕Kβ1
α1 , . . . ,Π
⊕Kβt
αt , Πˆ)
)
≤ σ
2n
where σ := 2
∑r
α=1
((
σα
2
)
+ σαq
′
α
)
and σα =
∑
1≤i≤t
αi=α
qi for every 1 ≤ α ≤ r.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 2. Let M i, Ci ∈ ({0, 1}n)qi ,
1 ≤ i ≤ t, Xα, Y α ∈ ({0, 1}n)q′α , 1 ≤ α ≤ r, be block-wise distinct tuples. From
(6), we have that
Iideal = Pr[Π¯i
(qi)(M i) = Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ t, Π(q′α)α (Xα) = Y α, 1 ≤ α ≤ r] =
=
t∏
i=1
1
P (2n, qi)
×
r∏
α=1
1
P (2n, q′α)
.
We say that a tuple of keys (K1, . . . ,Ks) is “bad” if one of the following holds:
1. There are 1 ≤ i, i′ ≤ t, 1 ≤ j ≤ qi, 1 ≤ j′ ≤ qi′ such that (i, j) 6= (i′, j′),
αi = αi′ , and Kβi ⊕Mαij = Kβi′ ⊕Mαi′j′ .
2. There are 1 ≤ i ≤ t, 1 ≤ j ≤ qi, 1 ≤ j′ ≤ q′αi such that Kβi ⊕Mαij = Xαij′ .
3. There are 1 ≤ i, i′ ≤ t, 1 ≤ j ≤ qi, 1 ≤ j′ ≤ qi′ such that (i, j) 6= (i′, j′),
αi = αi′ , and Kβi ⊕ Cαij = Kβi′ ⊕ Cαi′j′ .
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4. There are 1 ≤ i ≤ t, 1 ≤ j ≤ qi, 1 ≤ j′ ≤ q′αi such that Kβi ⊕ Cαij = Y αij′ .
Note that there are at most
∑r
α=1
(
σα
2
)
cases in the first and in the third items,
and at most
∑r
α=1 σαq
′
α cases in the second and fourth items.
If a key tuple is not bad, we say that it is a “good” key tuple. As in the proof
of Lemma 2, for a good key tuple all the inputs (outputs) of each permutation
are distinct. Thus, given a good tuple of keys (K1, . . . ,Ks), it is easy to see that
Pr[(Π
⊕Kβi
αi )
(qi)(M i) = Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ t,Π(q′α)α (Xα) = Y α, 1 ≤ α ≤ r] =
=
r∏
α=1
1
P (2n, σα + q′α)
≥ Iideal.
It now remains to bound the probability that a random key tuple is bad. This can
happen with one of the cases listed in items 1-4 where each case has probability
2−n to occur. Hence, the probability that a random key tuple is bad, is at most
σ
2n , and the probability that a random key tuple is good is therefore at least
1− σ2n . The result follows by Theorem 1.
4.2 Main theorems
Theorem 4. Consider the BPEM cipher BPEM[K0,K1,K2; f1, f2] where the
(secret) keys K0,K1,K2 are selected uniformly and independently at random.
Let q∗ be the maximum number of queries to the encryption/decryption oracle,
and let q1, q2 be the maximum numbers of queries to the public permutations f1
and f2, respectively. Then,
∆im-sprpBPEM (q∗, q1, q2) ≤
q∗(13q∗ + 4q1 + 4q2)
2n
.
Proof. By Lemma 1, we know that our BPEM construction is same as
LR[f
⊕K′1
1 , f
⊕K′2
1 , f
⊕K′3
2 , f
⊕K′4
2 ]⊕ (K ′6 ∗K ′5),
where K ′1, . . . ,K
′
6 are defined via (5) by K1,K2,K3,K4. The matrix in (5)
is lower triangular with non-zero diagonal, and hence non-singular. Thus, the
“new” keys K ′1, . . . ,K
′
6 are also distributed uniformly and independently. As
K ′5,K
′
6 are independent of all the “ingredients” of LR[f
⊕K′1
1 , f
⊕K′2
1 , f
⊕K′3
2 , f
⊕K′4
2 ],
it suffices to prove our result without the keys K ′5 and K
′
6.
Let Π1, . . . ,Π4 be random permutations of {0, 1}n and let Π be a random
permutation of {0, 1}2n, all are independent of each other and independent of
fˆ = (f1, f2)). Denote Fˆ = (f
⊕K′1
1 , f
⊕K′2
1 , f
⊕K′3
2 , f
⊕K′4
2 ) and Πˆ = (Π1, . . . ,Π4). By
Observation 2 and Lemma 3, we have7
∆±q∗,q1,q2
(
(LR[Fˆ ], fˆ); (LR[Πˆ], fˆ)
)
≤
≤ ∆±q∗,q∗,q∗,q∗,q1,q2
(
(Fˆ , fˆ); (Πˆ, fˆ)
)
≤ 4qF (2qF + q1 + q2)
2n
.
7 Note that each query to the oracle construction LR[g1, g2, g3, g4] translates to four
queries - one to each permutation gi, i = 1, . . . , 4
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Finally, by applying the triangle inequality, Observation 1 and Theorem 2, the
SPRP-advantage in the ideal model is
∆±q∗,q1,q2
(
(LR[Fˆ ], fˆ); (Π, fˆ)
)
≤
≤ ∆±q∗,q1,q2
(
(LR[Fˆ ], fˆ); (LR[Πˆ], fˆ)
)
+∆±q∗,q1,q2
(
(LR[Πˆ], fˆ); (Π, fˆ)
)
≤
≤ 4qF (2qF + q1 + q2)
2n
+∆±q∗
(
LR[Πˆ];Π
)
≤
≤ 4q∗(2q∗ + q1 + q2)
2n
+
5q2∗
2n
=
q∗(13q∗ + 4q1 + 4q2)
2n
.
The same argument can be used to show a similar bound for the single
permutation 2-rounds BPEM cipher.
Theorem 5. Consider the single permutation BPEM cipher BPEM[K0,K1,K2; f, f ]
where the (secret) keys K0,K1,K2 are selected uniformly and independently at
random. Let q∗ be the maximum number of queries to the encryption/decryption
oracle, and let q be the maximum number of queries to the public permutation
f . Then,
∆im-sprpBPEM[K0,K1,K2;f,f ](q∗, q) ≤
q∗(21q∗ + 8q)
2n
Remark 4. The difference in the bounds we received in Theorems 4 and 5 are
due only to the difference in the value of σ in the application of Lemma 3.
We also comment that the same bounds hold in the single key variants. By
(5) we have
BPEM[K,K,K; f1, f2] = LR[f
⊕K′1
1 , f
⊕K′2
1 , f
⊕K′2
2 , f
⊕K′3
2 ],
BPEM[K,K,K; f, f ] = LR[f⊕K
′
1 , f⊕K
′
2 , f⊕K
′
2 , f⊕K
′
3 ]
where K ′1K ′2
K ′3
 =
1 01 1
0 1
 · (KR
KL
)
.
For both constructions, the “new” keys K ′1,K
′
2,K
′
3 are no longer indepen-
dent, so we need to generalize lemma 3 as stated below.
Lemma 4. Let Π1, . . . ,Πr, Π¯1, . . . , Π¯t be independent random permutations of
{0, 1}n and K1, . . .Ks be chosen uniformly and independently from {0, 1}n. We
write Πˆ to denote (Π1, . . . ,Πr). Let (α1, . . . , αt) be a sequence of elements from
{1, . . . , r}. Let M be a binary matrix of size t× s, with no zero rows, satisfying
the following condition: for every 1 ≤ i1 < i2 ≤ t such that αi1 = αi2 , the ith1
and ith2 rows of M are distinct. Let K
′
i :=
∑s
j=1MijKj, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ t .
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Then, for any θ = (q1, . . . , qt, q
′
1, . . . , q
′
r) (specifying the maximum number of
queries) we have
∆±θ
(
(Π¯1, . . . , Π¯t, Πˆ); (Π
⊕K′β1
α1 , . . . ,Π
⊕K′βt
αt , Πˆ)
)
≤ σ
2n
where σ := 2
∑r
α=1
((
σα
2
)
+ σαq
′
α
)
and σ is as defined in Lemma 3.
We skip the proof of this lemma as it is similar to that of Lemma 3. Similarly
to the proof of Theorem 4 (while using Lemma 4 instead of Lemma 3), we can
obtain the following bound.
Theorem 6. Consider the single key BPEM cipher BPEM[K,K,K; f1, f2] where
the (secret) key K is selected uniformly at random. Let q∗ be the maximum num-
ber of queries to the encryption/decryption oracle, and let q1, q2 be the maximum
numbers of queries to the public permutations f1 and f2, respectively. Then,
∆im-sprpBPEM[K,K,K;f1,f2](q∗, q1, q2) ≤
q∗(13q∗ + 4q1 + 4q2)
2n
.
Finally, similarly to the proof of Theorem 5 (while using Lemma 4 instead of
Lemma 3, and using Theorem 3 instead of Theorem 2), we obtain the following
bound.
Theorem 7. Consider the single key single permutation BPEM cipher BPEM[K,K,K; f, f ]
where the (secret) key K is selected uniformly at random. Let q∗ be the maximum
number of queries to the encryption/decryption oracle, and let q be the maximum
number of queries to the public permutation f . Then,
∆im-sprpBPEM[K,K,K;f,f ](q∗, q) ≤
q∗(16q∗ + 8q)
2n
+
17q2∗
2n − 1 +
q2∗
22n
.
5 A distinguishing attack on BPEM
In this section we describe a distinguishing attack on BPEM that uses O(2n/2)
queries. This is the same attack as the one described in [20, Section 3.2] for the
4-rounds Luby-Rackoff with internal permutations, not at all surprising, since we
showed (in Section 2.3) that BPEM can be viewed as a 4-rounds Luby-Rackoff
with internal (keyed) permutations. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness,
we describe and analyze the attack in this BPEM terminology. We will use the
following technical lemma.
Lemma 5. If x, y, ρ ∈ {0, 1}n such that
x⊕ (BPEM[K0,K1,K2; f1, f2](x ∗ ρ))L =
= y ⊕ (BPEM[K0,K1,K2; f1, f2](y ∗ ρ))L (7)
then x = y.
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Proof. Denote
xˇ := LR 2[f1] ((x ∗ ρ)⊕K0)⊕K1,
yˇ := LR 2[f1] ((y ∗ ρ)⊕K0)⊕K1.
By (4) and (1) we have that
BPEM[K0,K1,K2; f1, f2](x ∗ ρ) = EMLR
2[f1],LR
2[f2]
K0,K1,K2
(x ∗ ρ) =
= LR 2[f2]
(
LR 2[f1]((x ∗ ρ)⊕K0)⊕K1
)⊕K2 = LR 2[f2] (xˇ)⊕K2,
hence, by (3),
(BPEM[K0,K1,K2; f1, f2](x ∗ ρ))L =
(
LR 2[f2] (xˇ)⊕K2
)
L
=
= xˇL ⊕ f2 (xˇR)⊕ (K2)L = x⊕ (K0)L ⊕ (K1)L ⊕ f1 (ρ⊕ (K0)R)⊕ f2 (xˇR)⊕ (K2)L.
Similarly
(BPEM[K0,K1,K2; f1, f2](y ∗ ρ))L =
= y ⊕ (K0)L ⊕ (K1)L ⊕ f1 (ρ⊕ (K0)R)⊕ f2 (yˇR)⊕ (K2)L.
Therefore we get from (5) that f2 (xˇR) = f2 (yˇR), hence, since f2 is injective,
xˇR = yˇR. Therefore, using (3) again,
ρ⊕ (K0)R ⊕ f1 (x⊕ (K0)L ⊕ f1(ρ⊕ (K0)R))⊕ (K1)R =
= ρ⊕ (K0)R ⊕ f1 (y ⊕ (K0)L ⊕ f1(ρ⊕ (K0)R))⊕ (K1)R,
hence
f1 (x⊕ (K0)L ⊕ f1(ρ⊕ (K0)R)) = f1 (y ⊕ (K0)L ⊕ f1(ρ⊕ (K0)R)) .
Since f1 is injective we get that
x⊕ (K0)L ⊕ f1(ρ⊕ (K0)R) = y ⊕ (K0)L ⊕ f1(ρ⊕ (K0)R),
hence x = y.
Proposition 2. Consider the BPEM cipher BPEM[K0,K1,K2; f1, f2] with ar-
bitrary (secret) keys K0,K1,K2. Let q∗ be the maximum number of queries to
the encryption oracle. Then,
∆prpBPEM(q∗) ≥ 1− e−
q∗(q∗−1)
2(2n+1) .
Remark 5. Note that Proposition 2 implies that the adversary advantage be-
comes non-negligible for q∗ = Ω(2n/2).
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Proof. Fix an n-bit string ρ and q∗ distinct n-bit strings ω1, ω2, . . . , ωq∗ . We
query the encryption oracle for the plaintexts ω1 ∗ ρ, ω2 ∗ ρ, . . . , ωq∗ ∗ ρ, and let
σ1, σ2, . . . , σq∗ be the corresponding ciphertexts. We now search for collisions
between the q∗ n-bit strings ω1⊕ (σ1)L, ω2⊕ (σ2)L, . . . , ωk ⊕ (σq∗)L. By Lemma
5 there will be no collision if the oracle encrypts using BPEM[K0,K1,K2; f1, f2].
By contrast, if the oracle encrypts by applying a randomly chosen permutation
of {0, 1}2n then the probability there is no collision is at most
q∗−1∏
k=1
(
1− k(2
n − 1)
22n − k
)
≤
q∗−1∏
k=1
(
1− k
2n + 1
)
≤
q∗−1∏
k=1
e−
k
2n+1 = e−
q∗(q∗−1)
2(2n+1) .
6 A practical constructions of a 256-bit cipher
In this section, we demonstrate a practical construction of a 256-bit block cipher
based on the 2-rounds BPEM cipher, where the underlying permutation is AES.
Definition 4 (EM256AES: a 256-bit block cipher). Let `1 and `2 be two
128-bit keys and let K0,K1,K2 be three 256-bit secret keys (assume `1, `2,K0,K1,K2
are selected uniformly and independently at random). Let the permutations f1
and f2 be the AES encryption using `1 and `2 as the AES key, respectively.
The 256-bit block cipher EM256AES is defined as the associated instantiation
of the 2-rounds BPEM cipher BPEM[K0,K1,K2; f1, f2].
Usage of EM256AES:
• `1 and `2 are determined during the setup phase, and can be made public
(e.g., sent from the sender to the receiver as an IV).
• K0,K1,K2 are selected per encryption session.
The single key EM256AES is the special case where a single value K ∈ {0, 1}256
and a single value ` ∈ {0, 1}128 are selected uniformly and independently at
random, and the EM256AES cipher uses K0 = K1 = K2 = K and `1 = `2 = `.
Hereafter, we use the single key EM256AES. To establish security properties
for EM256AES, we make the standard assumption about AES with a secret
key that is selected (uniformly at random): an adversary has negligible advan-
tage in distinguishing AES from a random permutation of {0, 1}128 even after
seeing a (very) large number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs (i.e., the assumption is
that AES satisfies its design goals ([1], Section 4). This assumption is certainly
reasonable if the number of blocks that are encrypted with the same keys is
limited to be much smaller than 264. Therefore, in our context, we can consider
assigning the randomly selected key ` at setup time, as an approximation for a
random selection of the permutation f1 = f2. Under this assumption, we can
rely on the result of Theorem 7 for the security of EM256AES.
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EM256AES efficiency: An encryption session between two parties requires
exchanging a 256-bit secret key and transmitting a 128-bit IV (= `). One key
(and IV) can be used for N blocks as long as we keep N  264.
Computing one (256-bit) ciphertext involves 4 AES computations (with the IV
as the AES key) plus a few much cheaper XOR operations. Let us assume that
the encryption is executed on a platform that has the capability of computing
AES at some level of performance. If the EM256AES encryption (decryption) is
done in a serial mode, we can estimate the encryption rate to be roughly half the
rate of AES (serial) computation on that platform (4 AES operations per one
256-bit block). Similarly, if the EM256AES encryption is done in a parallelized
mode, we can estimate the throughput to be roughly half the throughput of
AES.
EM256AES performance: To test the actual performance of EM256AES,
and validate our predictions, we coded an optimized implementation of
EM256AES. Its performance is reported here.
The performance was measured on an Intel Core i7-4700MQ (microarchitecture
Codename Haswell) where the enhancements (Intel Turbo Boost Technology,
Intel Hyper-Threading Technology, and Enhanced Intel Speedstep Technology)
were disabled. The code used the AES instructions (AES-NI) that are available
on such modern processors.
On this platform, we point out the following baseline: the performance of AES
(128-bit key) in a parallelized mode (CTR) is 0.63 C/B, and in a serial mode
(CBC) it is 4.44 cycles per byte (C/B hereafter).
The measured performance of our EM256AES implementation was 1.44 C/B for
the parallel mode, and 8.92 C/B for the serial mode. The measured performance
clearly matches the predictions.
It is also interesting to compare the performance of EM256AES to another 256-
bit cipher. To this end, we prepared an implementation of Rijndael256 cipher [6]
2. For details on how to code Rijndael256 with AES-NI, see [10]). Rijndael256
(in ECB mode) turned out to be much slower than EM256AES, performing at
3.85 C/B.
7 Discussion
In this work, we showed how to construct a large family of balanced permuta-
tions, and analyzed the resulting new variation, BPEM, of the EM cipher.
The resulting 2n-bit block cipher is obtained by using a permutation of
{0, 1}n as a primitive. The computational cost of encrypting (decrypting) one
2n-bit block is 4 evaluations of a permutation of {0, 1}n (plus a relatively small
overhead). Note that this makes BPEM readily useful in practice, for example to
define a 256-bit cipher, because “good” permutations of {0, 1}128 are available.
2 AES is based on the Rijndael block cipher. While AES standardizes only a 128 block
size, the Rijndael definitions support both 128-bit and 256-bit blocks
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We demonstrated the specific cipher EM256AES, which is based on AES, and
showed that its throughput is (only) half the throughput of AES (and 2.5 times
faster than Rijndael256).
A variation on the way by which BPEM can be used, would make it a tweak-
able 2n-bit block cipher. Here, the public IV (=`) can be associated with each
encrypted block as an identifier, to be viewed as the tweak. The implementation
would switch this tweak for each block. To randomize the keys for the (public)
permutations, an additional encryption (using some secret key) is necessary.
The expression of the advantage in Theorem 4 behaves linearly with the num-
ber of queries to the public permutations, and quadratically with the number of
queries to the encryption/decryption oracle. This reflects the intuition that the
essential limitations on the number of adversary queries should be on the encryp-
tion/decryption invocations, while weaker (or perhaps no) limitations should be
imposed on the number of queries to the public permutations. It also suggests
the following protocol, where the secret keys are changed more frequently than
the random permutations. Choose the public permutations for a period of, say,
1
10002
2n/3 blocks, divided into 2n/3 sessions of 110002
n/3 blocks. Change the secret
keys every session. This way, the relevant information on the block cipher, from
a specific choice of keys, is limited to a session, while the adversary can accumu-
late relevant information from replies to the public permutations across sessions.
Therefore, q∗ is limited to 110002
n/3, while q∗ + q1 + q2 is limited to 110002
2n/3.
Theorem 4 guarantees that this usage is secure.
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